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Abstract—Smart cities are increasingly relying on information
and communication technologies to cope with today’s challenges,
including increasing population, heterogeneous economic growth,
and environmental legislation hardening. The use of Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) generates a growing interest in coping with
such challenges, along with new business opportunities. As a re-
sult, it is expected to see the number of drone-based applications
to rise at a very fast pace, entailing new cybersecurity risks to
emerge. In this paper, we propose to tackle the problem of secure
communication among untrusting parties with a certificateless-
group authenticated key agreement (CL-GAKA) scheme. The
intent is to enable confidentiality, message integrity, and au-
thenticity in UAV-to-UAV communication. Provisioning untrusted
UAV networks with trusted communication will provide ground
for further research and applications, such as collaborative
cybersecurity deterrence, network extension using trusted relay
nodes, collaborative mission exercise in time-critical applications,
or anonymous communication for user privacy. Moreover, in
order to fill the gap of technology awareness, we provide an
implementation and demonstrate that the generation of a session
key between two users can be performed in approximately 600ms
on a Raspberry Pi 3 Model B+ system-on-chip (1.4GHz Cortex-
A53). Finally, the protocol is formally evaluated with the Scyther
tool.
I. INTRODUCTION
As cities grow in population, they have to rely more
and more on information and communication technologies in
order to provide efficient services at reduced cost. Among
these key technologies, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are
increasingly playing their part with major companies stepping
in. For instance, Amazon and Google are currently competing
in the development of a drone delivery service, i.e. Amazon
Prime Air and Project Wing respectively. AT&T has started to
automate its cell tower inspections by using drones. In 2017,
the city of Dubai has launched a flying taxi service, bringing
drones to the public transportation arena. Within smart cities,
drones will operate in a wide range of applications. This trend
is expected to grow at a (very) fast pace, resulting in more
and more organizations operating drones in urban areas.
Together with the many benefits of the use of UAVs in smart
cities, comes the need for regulation and security. One of the
main security concerns is secure communication, as drones
are vulnerable to cyber threats [1], [2]. With the proliferation
of drone-based services, it is becoming essential to devise
a protocol for secure channel establishment. These channels
are required for collision avoidance, data relay, identification,
mission planning, and so on. The use of UAV fleets is also
generating a great interest for operations such as network
extension, surveillance, and monitoring and mapping [3].
Secure channel protocols usually assume a prior relationship
between communicating entities. For example, they would be
preloaded with a common symmetric cryptographic key, a
password, or a pool of digital certificates. A multi-stakeholder
environment, such as a smart city, offers the potential for
a multiplicity of drone-based applications, causing as many
organizations to interact with each other. In this paper, we
address the problem of secure communication between un-
trusting parties. Our protocol allows UAVs belonging to dif-
ferent owners to interact and communicate securely with each
other. There it should encompass the following three key
requirements. First, as UAVs operate in open environments,
mutual authentication is indispensable. Secondly, different or-
ganizations may be involved, hence the necessity for joint key
control. Finally, the key escrow problem must be eliminated,
in order to prevent the third party from having full knowledge
of users’ secret keys.
In this paper, we propose a certificateless-group authenti-
cated key agreement (CL-GAKA) protocol, which provides
the above mentioned requirements. The intent is also to
include additional security attributes, such as revocation, non-
repudiation, denial of service prevention, and conditional
privacy. The contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows:
1) Propose a certificateless group authenticated key agree-
ment protocol dedicated to untrusted UAV networks,
based on the theoretical work of Teng et al. [4];
2) Implement and analyze the performance of the key
agreement protocol with a set of Raspberry Pi 3 Model
B+ system-on-chip (1.4GHz Cortex-A53).
Section 2 provides a background on UAV networks and key
agreement protocols. Section 3 describes the proposed CL-
GAKA scheme, and lists the desired security and operational
requirements. Finally, section 4 relates the implementation
details, the formal analysis, and the performance evaluation.
II. RELATED WORK AND RATIONALE
This section outlines the requirements for secure UAV-to-
UAV communications. Several approach to authenticated key
Table I: Comparative description of WSNs, VANETs, and UANETs
WSN VANET UANET
Description Wireless network consisting of spatiallydistributed sensors
Self-organizing wireless network con-
sisting of spatially distributed ground
vehicles
Self-organizing wireless network con-
sisting of spatially distributed airborne
drones
Node Category Low-end Medium-end Medium-end (civil)
Topology Star, mesh Mesh Star, mesh
Node Mobility Static High-speed, typically 0-30 m/s, in a 2-dimensions space
Very high-speed, typically 0-100 m/s,
in a 3-dimensions space
Ownership Nodes belong to the same system
Nodes are manufactured by different or-
ganizations and used by different own-
ers
Nodes are manufactured by different
organizations and potentially used by
different owners
Exchanged information Physical and environmental conditions Physical conditions Physical and environmental conditions,operational data, network traffic
Examples of applica-
tions
Environmental monitoring, structural
monitoring, industrial machine moni-
toring, process monitoring
Platooning, traffic information system,
road transportation emergency services,
electronic brake light, on-the-road ser-
vices
Environmental monitoring, network ex-
tension, delivery service, structural
monitoring, search & rescue, law en-
forcement
agreement are evaluated. Finally, related work is presented and
a rationale for the paper is provided.
A. Communication in UAV Networks
In many aspects, UAV ad-hoc networks (UANETs) are
similar to wireless sensor networks (WSNs) and vehicular
ad-hoc networks (VANETs). Table I compares singularities
among WSNs, VANETs, and UANETs. On the one hand,
it is observed that UAVs have PC-like computational power,
which allows more complex calculations than for sensors. On
the other hand, the autonomy of a UAV is more limited than
a ground vehicle, causing any computation (e.g. navigation)
to impact the drone’s resources. Furthermore, UAVs have
unique mobility capabilities, resulting in network connectivity
and communication efficiency issues. Communication among
UAVs is an imperative for mission exercise, although it does
not always occur among entities from the same organization.
Any operation taking place in urban areas is likely to require
exchange of sensitive data among untrusting entities. Further-
more, this collaboration can benefit time-critical operations,
and allow secure peer-to-peer network extension.
B. Secure Communication in UANETs
UAVs communicate over an open network, which is con-
trolled by an adversary. A communication protocol is secured
if it guarantees that an adversary cannot infiltrate the protocol.
There it should encompass at least three security properties:
confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity. Table II proposes
various security levels for communication protocols.
a) Confidentiality: privacy ensures that information is
not made available to unauthorized individuals or entities.
In other words, confidentiality protects the communication
against eavesdropping. An eavesdropper aims at either read-
ing the content of a message, or obtaining the origin and
destination of the message. Security levels 4 and 6-8 are
vulnerable to such malicious behaviour. In order to enforce
confidentiality, the communicating entities must encrypt the
message. For performance considerations, it is preferable to
use cryptographic algorithms with symmetric ciphers. As a
result, the entities must share a symmetric cryptographic key
to encrypt and decrypt messages. If the communicating entities
do not share a secret symmetric key, they must perform a key
agreement procedure.
b) Integrity: message integrity provides the assurance
that information cannot be tampered with by unauthorized
individuals without being detected. Message integrity protects
against replay attacks if it is added with session cookies
(unique session identifier) and message authentication codes
(MACs). In a replay attack, an adversary records the network
traffic and repeats the messages to its target. Thus it aims at
fooling an entity into a valid communication. A MAC is a
tag appended to the message, which contains the message in
ciphertext. Upon reception of a message, an entity computes
its own MAC and compares it against the one in the message.
Security levels 3, 5, and 7-8 are vulnerable to replay attacks.
The use of MAC also requires the communicating entities
to share a symmetric key, hence the necessity for a key
establishment protocol.
c) Authenticity: authentication refers to the process of
verifying the identity of a user, here a UAV. User authen-
tication differs from message authentication, which is the
act of verifying the integrity of an information. Authenticity
provides ground for non-repudiation and trust mechanisms.
Non-repudiation forbids a user from denying having performed
a communication session. Because non-repudiation requires
both integrity and user authenticity, security levels 2-3, and
5-8 are not appropriate. Additionally, authenticity precludes
spoofing attacks. A spoofing attack is a type of man-in-
the-middle (MiM) attack, where an adversary intercepts the
network traffic between the communicating entities, and im-
personates the sender to the receiver and vice versa. Thus,
the middle-man creates its own (secure) channels with the
receiver and the sender, allowing unrestricted modification of
Table II: Levels of security
Confidentiality Integrity Authenticity
Level 1 3 3 3
Level 2 3 3 7
Level 3 3 7 3
Level 4 7 3 3
Level 5 3 7 7
Level 6 7 3 7
Level 7 7 7 3
Level 8 7 7 7
the network traffic in transit. Security levels 2, 5-6, and 8 are
vulnerable to these attacks.
We have established that in order to provide confidentiality
and integrity to the communication, entities must perform a
key agreement procedure beforehand. In the remainder of this
paper, the key agreement procedure will be referred to as
the protocol, not the subsequent communication. Furthermore,
the protocol is extended to an authenticated key agreement
(AKA) one. As a result, entities will be able to generate a
session key and authenticate each other at the same time. Thus,
the AKA protocol will enable security level 1 in subsequent
communication.
C. Authenticated Key Agreement
One of the first public-key protocol for key agreement was
proposed in 1976 by W. Diffie and M. Hellman [5]. The Diffie-
Hellman (DH) key exchange method allows two (or more)
users to securely derive a secret key via unsecured channels.
The security of the DH method is based on the difficulty of cal-
culating discrete logarithms in a finite field, while its efficiency
is based on the ease of calculating exponentiation in the same
field. In other words, an adversary cannot recover the session
key even if it eavesdrops the protocol execution. However, the
DH method is vulnerable to MiM attacks, due to the absence
of user authentication. Subsequent proposals to the DH method
vary in the way mutual authentication is performed. We
will briefly describe four AKA categories: password-based,
certificate-based, identity-based, and certificateless-based.
a) Password-based: a trivial approach to mutual authen-
tication is to share a secret password among users. The security
of password-based protocols relies on the difficulty of guessing
(brute-force) the password. One example is the Encrypted
Key Exchange (EKE) scheme [6], where users rely on a
secret to authenticate each other, and to generate a random
public key. Because the password encrypts the public key,
it it is impossible to guess it without cracking the public
key algorithm. The EKE protocol however fails to provide
joint-key control, as one user arbitrarily chooses the session
key. More generally, the main drawback of this approach is
that users need to agree on a password a priori. Because it
must remain secret, this is suitable only for private networks.
Other password-based key exchange protocols include, among
others, Fortified Key Negotiation [7], SPEKE [8], AuthA [9],
PAK/PPK [10], and Dragonfly [11].
b) Certificate-based: another simple solution is to com-
bine the DH method with a digital signature scheme. This
approach relies on the use of digital certificates. Each user
is in possession of private/public key pair, of which the
public key is signed by a trusted third party. Each user must
obtain a certificate with the other user’s public key. They
verify the certificate with the third party’s public key, and
proceed with the key exchange process. The Station-To-Station
(STS) protocol [12] is a variant of the DH method, where
users demonstrate knowledge of the shared key by encrypting
their signatures, making authentication straightforward. This
method is also resilient to MiM attacks. However, the length
of exchanged messages is greatly increased as data needs to
be encrypted and/or signed, augmenting the performance over-
head. Furthermore, certificate-based schemes are dependent
on a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Certificate management
includes creating, distributing, storing, exchanging, verifying,
and revoking certificates. These processes are time-consuming,
error-prone, and their complexity often leads its users to prefer
a plain communication. Other certificate-based AKA protocols
have been proposed, such as MQV (revised by Law et al.) [13],
YAK [14], and ISAKMP [15].
c) Identity-based: in 1984, A. Shamir presented Identity-
Based Encryption (IBE) [16] as an alternative to PKI. Its main
advantage is that it eliminates the need for certificate manage-
ment. Later on, identity-based AKA protocols were proposed
[17], [18] based on bilinear pairings. In the initialization phase,
a trusted third party, called Key Generation Center (KGC), is
responsible for issuing private/public key pairs to every user.
During the key exchange, users exchange ephemeral keys,
and compute a unique session key, as in the DH method.
This method enables, among other security attributes, mutual
authentication and key confirmation. In addition, the PKI is
eliminated. On the other hand, the KGC is in possession
of users’ secret key. Thus, a malicious KGC is capable of
recovering every session key and performing standard MiM
attacks. This is referred as the key escrow problem. Other
influential identity-based AKA protocols have been proposed
by Chen and Kudla [19], Okamoto et al. [20], McCullagh et
al. [21], Ring et al. [22], and others.
d) Certificateless-based: in 2003, Al-Riyami et al. pub-
lished a seminal work on CertificateLess-Public Key Cryp-
tography (CL-PKC) [23]. It included, among other security
primitives, a CertificateLess-Authenticated Key Agreement
(CL-AKA) protocol. In this approach, the trusted third party
delivers a partial private key to each user. As a result, their CL-
AKA protocol offers the same advantages as in identity-based
AKA, while eliminating the key escrow problem. During the
key agreement phase, entities exchange ephemeral keys and
compute the session key using a bilinear pairing. Therefore,
the certificateless approach has the advantage to eliminate
the need for pre-established secrets, certificate management,
and key escrow. Therefore, the certificateless approach seems
to be the most advantageous for security and performance
considerations.
D. Group-based Authenticated Key Agreement
While the majority of CL-AKA protocols have been pro-
posed for two-party key agreement, fewer address the problem
of group key agreement [4], [24]–[27], i.e. more than two
entities. A group-based protocol is of significant interest for
swarm-based applications, as a single key is required for an
entire fleet. In 2012, Teng et al. [4] proposed a group key
agreement with constant rounds, meaning that the number of
rounds is independent from the number of users. Considering
that a set of messages must be broadcast after each round,
this feature is of particular interest in UANET applications.
Furthermore, it includes the majority of the desired security
attributes, apart from revocation and conditional privacy. Fi-
nally, our scheme makes use of asymmetric bilinear pairing,
for performance consideration. Therefore, we will use [4] as
a basis for the proposed CL-GAKA scheme.
E. Rationale
We have compared in section II.A the characteristics among
UANETs, VANETs, and WSNs. It has been shown that
UANETs deal with outstanding constrains including auton-
omy, node mobility, network connectivity, and communica-
tion efficiency. Furthermore, we have examined the security
properties of a communication protocol in open environments,
and concluded that it must capture at least confidentiality,
integrity, and authenticity. Finally, several approaches to the
entity (UAV) authentication problem have been studied, and
the certificateless approach has shown to be the most suitable
one.
III. PROPOSED PROTOCOL
This section describes the desired security and operational
security attributes. Presented heretofore is the CL-GAKA
protocol.
A. Scope of the Paper
This paper addresses UAV-to-UAV secure channel estab-
lishment. UAV-to-Infrastructure communication, as well as
the routing problem, are out of the scope of this paper.
Additionally, by enforcing entity authentication, it provides
ground for the implementation of a trust mechanism. The trust
mechanism itself is beyond this proposal. Finally, the group
key establishment protocol is designed for static groups. The
problem of dynamic UAV inclusion and delisting will be the
subject of future research.
B. Security & Operational Requirements
The proposed key exchange protocol uses a distributed
collaboration model. In other words, each entity has the same
amount of responsibilities toward other nodes in the network.
Security requirements include,
• Mutual authentication allows entities to authenticate
each other, preventing an adversary from perpetrating
spoofing attacks.
• Key escrow elimination protects entities against a mali-
cious third party, as the third party only holds a portion
of users’ secret keys.
• Mutual key agreement guarantees that every commu-
nicating entity takes part in the key generation process
(unlike in a key distribution scheme).
• Joint key control prevents one entity from influencing
the outcome of the key generation process, e.g. by pre-
determining a portion of the session key.
• Key freshness ensures that a new session key is generated
for every new communication session.
• Entity revocation prevents an entity from establishing
new sessions if its certificate has been revoked. The third
party delivers partial private keys that have a validity
period, e.g. per flight.
• Non-repudiation precludes an entity from repudiating
the establishment of a previous session (thus preventing
exhaustion attacks).
• Conditional privacy allows entities to communicate
anonymously by using pseudo-identities. Only the trusted
third-party is able to recover any entity’s identity from its
pseudo-identity.
• Known-key security prevents an adversary from learning
long-term secrets or session keys (future and past), if it
is in possession of a particular session’s key.
• Perfect forward secrecy precludes an adversary from
learning previous session keys, if it is in possession of
long-term secrets of other entities.
C. Definitions & Notations
This section briefly describes notions related to the certifi-
cateless scheme. Table III provides the list of notations used
in the proposed protocol.
a) Admissible pairings: given a cyclic additive group G1
of prime order q, and a cyclic multiplicative group G2 of the
same order, an admissible pairing is a map e : G1×G1 → G2
satisfying the following properties:
• Bilinear: e(aP, bQ) = e(P,Q)ab for all P,Q ∈ G1 and
a, b ∈ Z∗q .
• Non-degenerate: e(P,Q) 6= 1.
• Computable: e(P,Q) can be computed in polynomial
time for all P,Q ∈ G1.
b) Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) assumption: the BDH
problem forms the basis of security of our scheme. It is defined
as follows: given a tuple 〈P, aP, bP, cP 〉 with a, b, c ∈ Z∗q
uniformly randomly chosen, compute e(P,Q)abc. By using the
BDH assumption, it is considered that the BDH is infeasible,
where there is no polynomial time algorithm to solve the BDH
problem with non-negligible probability.
D. Proposed Protocol
The initialization phase consists of five algorithms. It is
performed offline and prepares entities for the online key
agreement procedure. The proposed initialization differs from
[4] in the way the user’s partial private key is created.
The partial-private-key-extract algorithm has been modified
in order to enforce entity revocation and conditional privacy.
Additionally, the original protocol uses a symmetric pairing
while ours makes the use of an asymmetric one, allowing
greater computational efficiency.
a) Initialization:
• Setup is run by the KGC. It outputs a set of public
parameters,
– Given three groups G1, G2, and GT of some prime
order q, choose a pairing e : G1 ×G2 → GT .
– Choose two random generators P ∈ G1, Q ∈ G2,
and compute g = e(P,Q) ∈ GT .
– Select a secret key s ∈ Z∗q and compute the public
key P0 = sP ∈ G1.
– Choose three cryptographic hash functions H1 :
{0, 1}∗ → Z∗q , H2 : G2 × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k, and
H3 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l.
– Publish parameters params as
〈G1,G2,GT , e, P,Q, P0, g,H1, H2, H3〉.
• Partial-private-key-extract is run by the KGC. It takes
as input params, the user’s temporary identity TIDi, a
time stamp ti, and a random string mi. It outputs the
user’s partial private key Di = (qi+ s)−1Q ∈ G2, where
qi = H1(TIDi||ti) and TIDi = H3(mi)⊕ IDi.
• Set-secret-value is run by the user. It outputs a random
integer xi ∈ Z∗q .
• Set-private-key is run by the user. It takes as input
params and the partial private key Di. It outputs the user’s
private key 〈xi, Di〉.
• Set-public-key is run by the user. It takes as input
params and xi. It outputs the user’s public key 〈qi, Pi〉,
with Pi = gxi ∈ GT .
b) Group Key Agreement:
• Setup. Each user ui sends a key establishment request,
containing its temporary identity TIDi, partial public key
qi, and expiration date/time ti of its partial public key.
• Round 1. Upon reception of the request, each user ui
verifies that tj is not out-of-date. If the verification is
invalid, ui terminates the protocol, otherwise ui chooses
a random ri ∈ Z∗q , ki ∈ {0, 1}k, and generates a set of
ephemeral keys Pi,j = ri(qjP + P0) = ri(qj + s)P for
1 ≤ j ≤ n and j 6= i. Each user ui then broadcasts the
set of Pi,j along with H3(ki).
• Round 2. Upon reception of H3(kj) and Pj,i, each user
ui computes sidwi = H3(k1)||...||H3(kn). Each user
ui then generates the set of tj,i = e(Pj,i, Di)xiP rij =
grjxi+rixj , Vj,i = H2(tj,i||sidwi ), and Kj,i = Vj,i ⊕ ki.
The set of Kj,i is broadcast.
• Key generation. Upon reception of Ki,j , each user
ui computes k˜j = Vj,i ⊕ Ki,j and checks whether
H3(k˜j) = H3(kj) is valid. Upon successful verifica-
tion, each user ui generates the session key skwi =
H3(k1||...||kn||sidwi ||pidwi ).
Table III: List of notations in the proposed protocol
Notation Description
q Large prime number
e Bilinear map, e : G1 × G2 → GT
P Generator point of G1
Q Generator point of G2
s KGC’s private key
P0 KGC’s public key, P0 = sP
H1 Hash function, H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q
H2 Hash function, H2 : G2 × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k
H3 Hash function, H3 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l
ui i-th user (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
IDi Identity of ui, of bit-length l
mi Random string
TIDi Temporary identity of ui, TIDi = H3(mi)⊕ IDi
ti Time stamp of ui’s public key validity
qi Partial public key of ui, qi = H1(TIDi||ti)
Di Partial private key of ui, Di = (qi + s)−1P
xi Secret value randomly chosen from Z∗q by ui
Pi Public value generated by ui, Pi = gxi
sidwi Session identifier for instance i of user w
pidwi Partner identifier for instance i of user w
|| Concatenation operator
⊕ XOR operator
E. Comparison Against Existing Protocols
Table IV provides a comparative analysis among several
CL-GAKA protocols [4], [24], [25], [27]–[31], and Won et
al.’s proposal [32]. It shows that all CL-GAKA protocols
encompass mutual key agreement, key escrow elimination,
mutual key agreement, joint key control, key freshness, and
known-key security. However, very few address entity revo-
cation, non-repudiation, and conditional privacy. Among the
closest proposals to the proposed protocol, [31] fails to provide
forward secrecy. [32] doesn’t account for joint key control
or mutual key agreement, and their proposal is not suitable
with group key establishment. Though it is worth mentioning
that this protocol addresses two-party UAV-to-smart object
key agreement. While [27] proposes a pairing-free anonymous
scheme, it requires the KGC to be involved in the online key
agreement phase. Because the KGC might not be available to
each entity in operation, [4] is preferred as the basis for our
UAV-to-UAV CL-GAKA scheme.
IV. PROTOCOL EVALUATION
This section provides the implementation details along with
a performance evaluation. The results of the formal analysis
are then outlined.
A. Implementation & Performance Evaluation
The testbed is described in figure 1. It consists of two Rasp-
berry Pi 3 Model B+, and a wireless router. Each Raspberry Pi
is supplied with a 1.4GHz 64-bit quad-core ARMv8 processor,
as well as a Wi-Fi dongle.
The protocol has been implemented in C language, and
makes use of the PBC library [33]. Because the initialization
Table IV: Comparative analysis among several certificateless protocols for authenticated key agreement
[24] [28] [25] [29] [30] [31] [32] [27] [4] Proposed protocol
Mutual authentication           
Key escrow elimination           
Mutual key agreement       -    
Joint key control       -    
Key freshness           
Entity revocation - - - - - -  - -  
Non-repudiation - - - - -   -   
Conditional privacy - - - - - - -  -  
Known-key security           
Forward secrecy -     -     
phase is performed offline, it is not measured. Figure 2 shows
the performance results for the online key agreement phase,
including the communication overhead. It is observed that,
over two hundred simulations, and after removing outliers, the
average elapsed time lies between 580ms and 620ms. Figure 3
shows further detailed performance results. The key agreement
is first performed between two Raspberry Pi nodes, each
communicating via its wireless local area network (WLAN)
interface (figure 1). The total elapsed time is measured as
598ms, while the first and second round last respectively 13ms
and 417ms. In order to measure the communication overhead,
the same implementation is then executed over the loopback
interface. Thus a single node is emulating both client and
server. The total elapsed time is evaluated as 471ms, while the
first and second round last respectively 9ms and 345ms. Table
V describes the number of operations performed in each round.
It outlines that the second round includes n−1 bilinear pairing
operations, where n is the number of entities (e.g. for two
entities, each must perform one bilinear pairing). Because such
an operation is computationally very expensive, the second
round is responsible for 71% of the total elapsed time.
Furthermore, by comparing the results between the first
and second setup (figure 3), the communication overhead is
calculated as 21% of the total elapsed time. The remaining
overhead is caused by the key agreement setup, key generation,
Figure 1: Testbed
Table V: Complexity analysis
Round 1 Round 2
Bilinear pairing - n− 1
Modular exponentiation - 2(n− 1)
Elliptic curve point multiplication 2(n− 1) n− 1
Elliptic curve point addition n− 1 -
and further code execution.
B. Formal Analysis
The Scyther tool has been chosen to formally analyze the
protocol. Scyther is used to find attack paths in security
protocols under the perfect cryptography assumption. It takes
as input a high-level description of the protocol, and evaluates
the desired security properties, i.e. security claims. The role of
each communicating entity is defined as a set of events, such
as sending and receiving messages. Internal computations have
been simplified as one-way functions, and a key confirmation
round has been added for the sake of the evaluation. Our
protocol description is given in Appendix A, with Alice being
the initiator, and Bob the responder. Scyther succeeded in
proving the following security claims,
• Secrecy of the session key.
• Aliveness.
• Weak agreement.
• Non-injective agreement.
• Non-injective synchronisation.
V. CONCLUSION & FURTHER WORK
In this paper, we have outlined the requirements for secure
UAV-to-UAV communication over open networks. In order
to meet these requirements, a certificateless-authenticated key
agreement scheme has been proposed. This approach enables
the elimination of the certificate management and the key-
escrow problems. As a result, the key exchange protocol
is highly suitable for resource-constrained devices. Further-
more, the proposed protocol accounts for groups of entities,
Figure 2: Online key agreement performance results
allowing more than two entities to generate a symmetric
cryptographic key at once. Several theoretical works have
been studied against the desired security properties. In this
paper, we proposed a certificateless group authenticated key
agreement protocol, based on [4]. The implementation shows
that the online key agreement phase can be performed in
approximately 600ms between two entities, on a Raspberry
Pi 3 Model B+ system-on-chip (1.4GHz Cortex-A53). Finally,
the proposed scheme has been evaluated with the Scyther tool,
showing that our protocol is resilient against several attacks.
The work presented in this paper provides ground for
applications such as collaborative cybersecurity deterrence,
network extension using trusted relay nodes, collaborative
mission exercise in time-critical applications, or anonymous
communication for user privacy. However, further research
is required. The presented protocol is currently suitable for
static groups only, i.e. the number of communicating entities
is constant during the session. In future work, the protocol
must encompass dynamic groups, allowing dynamic inclusion
and delisting of entities in the same session. Furthermore, the
problem of misbehavior from authenticated entities has not
been considered. Further work will address this challenge with
reputation or trust-based mechanisms.
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APPENDIX A
SCYTHER SCRIPT
hashfunction H3, Pij, Kji, kj;
usertype SessionKey;
protocol clgaka(Alice, Bob)
{
role Alice
{
fresh TIDA: Ticket;
fresh qA: Ticket;
fresh tA: Ticket;
fresh DA: Ticket;
fresh rA: Nonce;
fresh kA: Nonce;
var TIDB, qB, tB;
var PBA;
var hashOfkB;
var KAB;
var kB;
var sk: SessionKey;
send_1(Alice, Bob, TIDA, qA, tA);
recv_2(Bob, Alice, TIDB, qB, tB);
send_3(Alice, Bob, Pij(rA, qB), H3(kA));
recv_4(Bob, Alice, PBA, hashOfkB);
send_5(Alice, Bob, Kji(H3(kA), hashOfkB, PBA, DA
, rA, kA));
recv_6(Bob, Alice, KAB);
match(kB, kj(H3(kA), hashOfkB, PBA, DA, rA, KAB)
);
match(sk, H3(kA, kB, H3(kA), hashOfkB, TIDA,
TIDB));
send_7(Alice, Bob, {TIDA, Pij(rA, qB), Kji(H3(kA
), hashOfkB, PBA, DA, rA, kA)}sk);
recv_8(Bob, Alice, {TIDB, PBA, KAB}sk);
claim(Alice, Secret, sk);
claim(Alice, Alive);
claim(Alice, Weakagree);
claim(Alice, Nisynch);
claim(Alice, Niagree);
}
role Bob
{
fresh TIDB: Ticket;
fresh qB: Ticket;
fresh tB: Ticket;
fresh DB: Ticket;
fresh rB: Nonce;
fresh kB: Nonce;
var TIDA, qA, tA;
var PAB;
var hashOfkA;
var KBA;
var kA;
var sk: SessionKey;
recv_1(Alice, Bob, TIDA, qA, tA);
send_2(Bob, Alice, TIDB, qB, tB);
recv_3(Alice, Bob, PAB, hashOfkA);
send_4(Bob, Alice, Pij(rB, qA), H3(kB));
recv_5(Alice, Bob, KBA);
send_6(Bob, Alice, Kji(hashOfkA, H3(kB), PAB, DB
, rB, kB));
match(kA, kj(hashOfkA, H3(kB), PAB, DB, rB, KBA)
);
match(sk, H3(kA, kB, hashOfkA, H3(kB), TIDA,
TIDB));
recv_7(Alice, Bob, {TIDA, PAB, KBA}sk);
send_8(Bob, Alice, {TIDB, Pij(rB, qA), Kji(
hashOfkA, H3(kB), PAB, DB, rB, kB)}sk);
claim(Bob, Secret, sk);
claim(Bob, Alive);
claim(Bob, Weakagree);
claim(Bob, Nisynch);
claim(Bob, Niagree);
}
}
